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1. Introduction
The governance of cyberspace confronts states with traditional questions of
sovereignty and identity: can they provide for their own security, or do they rely on the
protection of other, more technologically advanced nations? Do they shape their identity
in international security by following their own values or do they compromise their
interests for the sake of cooperation? In the recent NSA surveillance scandal, these rather
traditional questions have erupted in a new light. While appearing as a short-term security
issue at first, the tension over surveillance has solidified the ways in which sovereignty
manifests itself in cyberspace. A yet relatively unregulated space, the Internet possesses
unique features such as the interconnectedness of users, the ambiguity of jurisdiction, and
the accessibility of private information in a public domain. While all of these factors
require an adaptation in defining state sovereignty in cyberspace, the NSA scandal has
demonstrated that states project traditional, pre-existing values, and perspectives on the
exercise of power onto cyberspace. This lack of adaptation in a new environment causes
a long-term governance issue that will inevitably require more transparency and the
defining of international norms.
The analysis of the NSA scandal through the lens of German foreign policy
exemplifies this issue most eminently. Despite having gradually regained its sovereignty
and identity in international security affairs in the post-war period, Germany took on a
unique role in the scandal as the main target of the surveillance program (DW, 2013).
Desiring a more independent position in security policy and valuing the protection
privacy, the state finds itself in a transition phase in the transatlantic partnership: as
Europe as a whole carries more weight in international security, the demand for U.S.
5

influence in European security policy has decreased (Zimmerman, 2005, 143). However,
the lack of regulation and state legitimacy in cyberspace allowed the United States to
enforce its values in international security and hold on to its desired scope of influence
over European security. The dichotomy between intelligence and privacy—the security
interests of the respective opposing sides—causes an irreconcilable governance issue.
This dynamic demonstrates how pre-existing values and power structures in international
affairs do not translate onto cyberspace. Instead, the clashes of opposing interests become
intensified.

Threats and Sovereignty in Cyberspace
The diversity of actors in the Internet has complicated the definition of state
sovereignty beyond the realm of territories. If not compromising state sovereignty, it has,
at the least, raised questions over how sovereignty manifests itself in a yet largely
“ungoverned” virtual territory (Nye, 2003, 68). The cyber age, therefore, presents new
challenges for long-term governance.
The development of postwar Germany is an exemplary case of the traditional
sense of sovereignty. German normalization, the broad term under which the regaining of
sovereignty falls, represented a decline of external control over its foreign policy. A
regaining of sovereignty also included rearmament and the dismissal of the occupation
statute by the allies, a step that granted the German administration full control over its
territory (Haftendorn, 2006, 15). German sovereignty also signified the legitimization of
the newly arranged government, a factor that carries a lot of symbolic value (14).
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Cyberspace complicates these traditional factors. The interconnectedness of actors
operating online eliminates the territorial approach to defining sovereignty and
jurisdiction. The resulting ambiguity of legal boundaries and the seeming absence of state
control in the Internet complicate the physical manifestation and legitimization of state
sovereignty. While governments employ architectural methods to symbolically represent
sovereignty, private corporations take on a greater physical presence as they provide the
services enabling the exchange of information. The transformation of private information
into the public sphere, however, has extended the scope by which states can execute their
sovereignty and security objectives. In this way, cyberspace limits sovereignty in its
physical representation but facilitates its enforcement in security affairs.
This facilitation has raised the question whether cyberspace generates significant
threats to national security. Advancements in technology have always influenced not only
warfare and conflict but also the actors involved and the likelihood of conflict to occur
(Andrews, 2012, 91). Cyber technology in particular has facilitated the means of warfare
for a broader range of actors. Valuable targets such as government secrets, individual
financial and personal information are more accessible than ever, as the Internet has
dissolved the challenges brought forth by geography (91). Jurisdiction, physical security,
and financial aspects have traditionally posed challenges to non-state actors in the
security realm. The newly gained accessibility and ambiguity of jurisdiction have
encouraged an increase in threats originating from non-state actors. In 2012, the
Department of Homeland Security documented 198 cyber attacks targeting the
information systems of private companies in several industrial sectors, a 52 percent
increase from the previous year (Goldman, 2013). The attacks posed a security threat to
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U.S. infrastructure, with the energy sector recording 82 of these attacks (Goldman, 2013).
Most cases not only remain unreported but also unresolved (Goldman; Andres). Parallel
to the rise of non-state involvement, states have increasingly used force in what James
Adams called a “new international battlefield” in 2001. With over 30 states having
invested in advancing their capacity for cyber warfare, nations now have the capability to
attack the defense systems and infrastructures of foreign governments. Most notably, this
strategy of virtual warfare was employed in Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008
(Adams, 102; Reveron, 2012, 3).
While the new landscape of actors and online threats do not necessarily impact
state sovereignty but rather require its adaptation, the act of cyber surveillance conducted
by states brings forth more pressing questions on sovereignty. Particularly in cases in
which surveillance does not represent an act of war but a preemptive security measure, a
technologically advanced state can undermine the sovereignty of other actors by
enforcing its security objectives at the cost of values and legal systems present in other
states. Cyber surveillance, therefore, can be distinguished in the debate on cyber security
and sovereignty.
The first chapter will focus on the ways in which sovereignty manifests itself in
cyberspace and how states project their values in security onto this space. These themes
spark the question of cyber security—does cyberspace generate a security risk? This
question will solidify broader mechanisms of power and sovereignty that will eventually
lead into the discussion of German foreign policy and current power constellations in
transatlantic relations. This historical approach will help me analyze the ways in which
traditional perceptions of power and sovereignty have manifested themselves in the NSA
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surveillance scandal and the implementation of cyber security measures in the United
States and Germany.

2. Sovereignty in the Cyber Age
Adapting Sovereignty
The emergence of cyberspace has caused a critical need to adapt our
understanding of sovereignty. This question appears as urgent not only because of
reasons linked to international security but also because of the long-term governance
issue cyberspace entails. While the NSA scandal has brought forth the issue of cyber
security, it has also demonstrated that the ways in which states approach cyber security
has implications for civil liberties in a space lacking international norms. As sovereign
states hold different values and implement different measures to ensure the civil liberties
of their citizens, it is significant to understand how sovereignty is defined and manifests
itself in cyberspace. In this way, the emergence of cyberspace has created a chain
reaction: the exercise of cyber security by one state poses a threat to the sovereignty of
another, undermining this state’s security objectives and protection of its citizens’ civil
liberties. This dilemma in turn causes the need to reflect on sovereignty and collaboration
through international norms in cyberspace.
Cyberspace complicates our understanding of sovereignty as a result of three
distinct features: (1) the ambiguity of the legitimacy of power, (2) the interconnectedness
of actors and resulting ambiguity of jurisdiction, (3) the accessibility of private
information in a public domain. The analysis of these three components indicates that
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cyberspace requires a redefinition of sovereignty and an adaptation of the ways in which
states exercise their sovereignty in cyberspace.
Traditionally, the construction of sovereignty required the acknowledgment of
implementing institutions, granting them the legitimacy to govern within a defined
territory. In cyberspace, however, legitimacy remains more ambiguous than in the
physical world. This ambiguity is created in part through the culture the Internet has
produced. The wealth or even affluence of information, the ability to exchange this
information with users throughout the globe, and the dissolving of physical boundaries
have instilled a sense of illimitability and seeming absence of state power. Users of
spaces offered by private corporations such as social media platforms have the ability to
produce and individualize information. The major external entities setting the limits of
and regulating this production are the corporations offering this space. The privatization
of the Internet and its effective enabling of interconnectivity consequently seem to
contradict regulation by governmental institutions. This contradiction is amplified by the
difficulty in representing state sovereignty in a virtual world. While states employ
physical representations such as monuments, governmental institutions, and other
architectural symbols of sovereignty and legitimacy, the lack of such representations in a
virtual space complicates the instilling a sense of legitimacy.
The virtual absence of the state in cyberspace also relates to the ambiguity of
territory and jurisdiction. As the traditional definition of the sovereignty of states has
heavily relied on territorial boundaries and jurisdiction, the interconnectedness of the
Internet inevitably challenges this definition. International corporations such as social
media sites or search engines host spaces for citizens to exchange information throughout

10

the world. Every information exchange can cross from one jurisdiction to the other. As
some states such as China have enforced their jurisdiction by limiting or controlling their
citizens’ use of these spaces, others have remained in the background in regulating online
information exchange. Both of these approaches come along with their individual sets of
problems. A limitation of exchange of or access to information may undermine civil
liberties such as freedom of speech. An unregulated cyberspace leaves citizens
unprotected from criminal activity originating from domestic or foreign perpetrators. In
the case of foreign perpetrators, the lack of territorial jurisdiction complicates their
prosecution. Both foreign criminals and the intelligence services of other states can
therefore attack or infringe upon the civil liberties of sub-entities of a state without
crossing any territorial borders. While such infiltration into the territory of a state would
have traditionally been defined as an undermining of state sovereignty and violated
international law, the virtual nature of cyberspace complicates this traditional definition.
The interconnectedness of users, therefore, suggests that jurisdiction cannot be enforced
through clear territorial borders but requires an adaptation so that the international
community can clearly define the infringement of state sovereignty in cyberspace.
The issue of shifting private information into the public domain pertains to the
limitation of state sovereignty. The private, physical space occupied by citizens
represents the limits of state sovereignty in many countries, manifesting itself in privacy
laws in Europe or the Fourth Amendment in the United States, which prevents
warrantless searches of private homes. Cyberspace has complicated the definition of
privacy infringement as citizens occupy their own virtual space on the one hand but also
publish their private information in a public domain. The absence of clear jurisdictional
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boundaries, the fading distinction between the private and public sphere in cyberspace,
and the technological capacity to access the private sphere of individuals across the world
without the knowledge of the users have created the possibility that states widen and
overstep the boundaries of their sovereignty that have traditionally limited them in the
physical world. The accessibility of private information, therefore, sparks the debate over
the scope of sovereignty in a virtual space that provides an affluence of new ways in
which states can enforce their sovereignty.

Enforcing Sovereignty
The three ways in which cyberspace complicates traditional views on sovereignty
consequently raises the question how sovereignty manifests itself in cyberspace. The
NSA scandal showed that current governance of cyberspace is quite security oriented and
that sovereignty manifests itself in the way in which states implement security measures
to enforce their objectives. Two distinct ways have surfaced through this scandal and help
explain security policy decisions in cyberspace: First, states enforce their sovereignty
based on their perception of security threats, which originates from underlying values in
international security. Second, states attempt to maintain pre-existing power structures
and maximize their autonomy in cyberspace.
The definition and perception of security threats in cyberspace has remained
ambiguous and varies across different nations. This ambiguity seems to have instilled
uncertainty and fear, resulting in exaggerated security measures. As the perception of
threats depends in part on cultural factors, sovereignty manifests itself in the ways in
which states project their values onto cyberspace and enforce these values in their
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treatment of data and information. States that value the protection of privacy, for
instance, perceive an infringement of privacy as a security threat and will implement
policies accordingly. States that value a strong governmental presence in shaping political
culture will perceive the exchange of and access to certain information as a security threat
and take a more proactive approach to limiting these uses of the Internet. States that value
the physical protection of their citizens will perceive information exchange as an
opportunity to oversee communication and prevent possible acts of terrorism. In all of
these cases, the ambiguity of the virtual space has the potential to create fear and
uncertainty: to what extent does technology enable actors to access private information?
What is the potential of information exchange and knowledge with regards to political
activism? Do extremist groups have the technological sophistication to facilitate or even
execute terrorist attacks in cyberspace? As these questions raise even more uncertainties,
the NSA scandal has demonstrated that states tend to compensate for a lack of knowledge
through extensive and proactive security measures.
Simultaneously, these security measures pertain to the maintenance of power and
ways of governing. While the protection of privacy, the control of information exchange,
and the gathering of information or intelligence purposes have always played a role in
exercising state sovereignty, cyberspace has intensified the scope by which these
measures have to be carried out: privacy pertains to a broader range of actors and data,
information exchange occurs on a more frequent and interconnected basis, and securityrelated information is increasingly accessible. Maximizing the capacity and autonomy by
which these measures can be implemented, states attempt to maintain pre-existing ways
of exercising power in a space that intensifies the clash of security objectives. In the NSA
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case, for instance, the United States projected its military power onto cyberspace and
maintained its pre-existing leadership and autonomy within the transatlantic partnership.
The gathering of data represented the major tool of this militarization and enforcing of
U.S. sovereignty.

A Need for Surveillance?

The emergence of information technology has added a wide range of problems to
ensuring national security (Gravelle, 2012, 111). As many opportunities as the Internet
provides to corporations and Internet users, it also provides opportunities to extremists
and hackers. The unique characteristic of cyberspace is the simplicity of access. While
other realms of operation for terrorists require financial investment, cyberspace requires
only technological knowledge and devices that connect to the Internet (Reveron, 2012,
7). The infrastructures of the state and the energy sector, bank accounts of private
individuals, operating systems of government agencies, and data stored by large
corporations are directly accessible and vulnerable targets to a wider range of actors (11).
In fact, individuals and non-state actors conduct most malicious activity on the Internet
while some attacks can be traced back to government-sponsored programs (11). The wide
range of actors and unlawful actions in cyberspace complicate the definition of cyber
terrorism and its threat to international security. However, the NSA surveillance scandal
has uncovered the existence of both incentives for states to conduct cyber surveillance
and differences in the values and priorities they project onto cyber security programs. It
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has raised the question whether these incentives originate from real threats and
opportunities.
The definition of cyber terrorism has derived from a wider spectrum of uses of
cyberspace for illegal purposes and is more ambiguous than the definition of cyber
warfare (Awan, 2012, 23). Timothy Thomas notes that the “Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) has defined cyberterrorism as the unlawful destruction or disruption of digital
property to intimidate or coerce people” (Thomas, 2003, 112-13). Similarly, scholars
such as Gabriel Weimann (2004) see cyber threats as generally unlawful means to attack
the infrastructures of states, including cyber terrorism in the wide spectrum of illegal
activities occurring in cyber space (Stohl, 2007). According to Imran Awan, however,
there needs to exist a differentiation between cyber terrorism and cyber crime—a
necessary distinction to separate the very pressing issue of cyber crime from the yet
ambiguous concept of cyber terrorism (Awan, 33). Michael Stohl concludes that the
definition of cyber terrorism needs to align with traditional views of terrorism and defines
it as, “The purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or
compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat” (Stohl, 2007). With
this definition, Stohl maintains the “effects-based” approach but emphasizes that the
intention behind an attack characterizes it as an act of cyber terrorism (Stohl, 2007). In a
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services in 2000, Dorothy Denning defined
cyber terrorism as, “the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace” (Denning, 2000, 1).
Like Stohl, she stresses that, “to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear.
Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water

15

contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against
critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact.
Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not”
(1). All of these different definitions solidify the question whether cyber terrorism poses a
real threat to governments.
While scholars are aware of the organizational uses of cyberspace as described by
Timothy Thomas and Gabriel Weimann, they are more skeptical about the existence of
cyber terrorism based on Denning’s definition. In fact, Michael Stohl argues that cyber
terrorist attacks with severe outcomes have not yet occurred (Stohl, 2007). Even though
Denning mentions several instances in which politically motivated hackers have caused
severe financial and material damage in the past, she acknowledges that the concept of
cyber terrorism is “mainly theoretical,” as none of the attacks have caused any physical
harm to civilians” (Henning, 1-2). However, she speaks of infrastructural vulnerabilities
terrorists, if acquiring the technical knowledge, could potentially use to their advantage.
This speculative view of cyber terrorism is what Imran Awan calls the “Doomsday
Scenario,” according to which terrorists would employ cyber technology to cause
airplane crashes or to take charge of missiles and bombs (Awan, 24). Despite the
speculation about terrorists’ technological capabilities in cyberspace and the threats
against which states are vulnerable, the Internet seems to have great value to national
security. At the very least, scholars have argued, the Internet offers terrorists an
operational structure, which facilitates the execution of attacks in the physical world.
Consequently, scholars have engaged in a discussion over how terrorists use the
Internet. Maura Conway argues that the wide range of uses to which scholars such as
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Fred Cohen (2002), Timothy L. Thomas (2003), or Gabriel Weimann (2004) have
referred fall under five overarching categories: “information provision, financing,
networking, recruitment, and information gathering” (Conway, 2005, 3). In some
respects, these uses of cyberspace by terrorists seem to align with the ways in which other
non-state actors such as hackers and criminals operate. While cyber crime has existed in
the form of malicious activity such as identity theft or the disrupting of governmental and
corporate networks, cyber terrorism can appear in similar actions that are motivated by
political or ideological agendas.

In this context, terrorists have also employed the

Internet for propaganda, networking, recruiting, and training of new members. Websites
of extremist groups contain messages, forums, and videos furthering the cause of their
political beliefs. While these uses of cyberspace do not directly represent terrorist acts,
they are closely linked to the organizational structure and execution of terrorist acts in the
physical world (Awan, 23-31). There exist, however, more direct ways in which terrorists
can employ cyberspace for the execution of terrorist acts. During the September 11
attacks, for instance, terrorists used encrypted messages to communicate with each other,
laying the foundation for their attacks (Awan, 28). In recent years, the concern over direct
terrorist attacks through cyberspace has grown in the intelligence community. While
hackers without political agendas have managed to disrupt infrastructures or corporate
networks in the past, the British intelligence agencies, for example, have voiced their
concern over a rise of terrorism through similar cyber attacks (Awan, 21).
The main concern of the intelligence community is what Timothy Thomas calls
“cyberplanning”—“the digital coordination of an integrated plan stretching across
geographical boundaries that may or may not result in bloodshed. It can include
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cyberterrorism as part of the overall plan” (Thomas, 2003, 113). This definition pertains
especially to the organizational means of Internet services. Conway’s five uses broadly
categorize instances of cyberplanning. Information provision includes the spread of
messages to a broad audience that may serve propaganda purposes or even psychological
warfare, instilling fear of the capabilities of terrorist organizations (5). The videotaped
executions of Nick Berg and Daniel Pearl in the early 2000s are two examples (5). The
spread of messages usually takes place through websites affiliated with extremist groups.
These websites often provide opportunities for fundraising as well: they target specific
visitors and potential donors through encrypted messages (6). In some cases, extremists
attract unknowing donors through fake websites of charities that claim to follow peaceful
intentions (Thomas, 2003, 116). In this way, much of the funding systems remain
invisible to intelligence agencies.
Terrorists employ similar techniques to recruit new members (117). As
propaganda occurs in a public manner, potential members may become attracted to
extremist views. With regards to networking, Conway observes that the use of online
communication is causing the decline of hierarchical structures within terrorist
organizations:

sophisticated

undercover

communication

systems

enable

the

decentralization of power and a shift towards network-like power structures (Conway,
10-11).
While terrorist communication remains mostly unnoticed, extremists make use of
publicly available information: in 2003, “Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld observed
that an al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan said, ‘Using public sources
and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all
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information required about the enemy’” (Thomas, 118). This information may include
infrastructural or architectural features of potential targets, as demonstrated by an al
Qaeda computer containing information of a dam with which engineers could plan a
possible attack more efficiently (118).
All of these uses facilitate the coordination of terrorist attacks in the physical
world and incentivize governments to establish measures to gain valuable information on
terrorist activity. Yet, these uses merely represent indirect links to terrorist attacks. As
argued by most scholars, cyberspace does not yet pose a security threat in itself. The
answer to the question whether there is a need for surveillance or not, therefore, depends
on interpretations, values, and psychological effects the perceived threat of cyber
terrorism imposes on administrations and how these factors manifest themselves in the
institutional and legal structures of national security. However, the NSA scandal has
indicated an exaggeration of security measures in the United States and shows the
currently imbalanced and inefficient approach to governing cyberspace.
As a consequence, states apply pre-existing, traditional perceptions of power and
sovereignty and values in international security onto a space that requires a redefinition
of these terms. The transatlantic relationship, German-American relations in particular,
have solidified this dichotomy. The evolution of German foreign policy—Germany’s
reemergence from a semi-sovereign status to a major actor in international security—and
its close link to American security policy outlines the pre-existing perceptions of
sovereignty and power that incentivized the construction of sovereignty in cyberspace.
The clash of identities and values in the German-American case exemplifies the
impossibility of the traditional exercise of power in cyberspace.
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3. The Evolution of German Foreign Policy
The Way to Sovereignty
In August 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany held its first elections. With
Theodor Heuss as the federal president and Konrad Adenauer as the first chancellor, the
elections marked a first step towards autonomy. This first step, however, came along with
a set of conditions: the Allies would maintain jurisdiction through an occupation statute,
which granted them control particularly on the foreign and security policy front
(Haftendorn, 2006, 15). On September 21, 1949, representatives of the allied states came
together in Bonn to present the occupation statute to Adenauer. The planned formality of
this ceremony and its actual outcome symbolized the integration process of the Federal
Republic into the West (Haftendorn, 14). While the commissioners had restricted
Adenauer from joining them on the red carpet before the chairman’s official declaration
of the statute, the chancellor skillfully bypassed this rule, as he recounts: “I went up to the
Petersberg in the company of a few federal ministers. We were led into a room where we
were received by the three High Commissioners standing on a carpet. Francois-Poncet
was chairman that day. While I stopped in front of the carpet he took one step forward to
greet me. I saw my opportunity, went towards him and thus stood on the carpet myself.
None of the High Commissioners objected. Francois-Poncet gave his speech”
(Haftendorn, 15). Adenauer’s account represents the larger picture of German integration
into the West; the idea that the allies would cease formal provisions within the context of
reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, and common security objectives.
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The reemergence of Germany as an autonomous actor in international security
has, therefore, largely been an extending of its scope of action with regards to Europe and
the United States. The end of World War II and the founding of a West German state in
1949 represented the beginnings of a “Road to Europe” on the one hand and the
establishment of an “Atlantic Alliance” on the other (Haftendorn, 83). The regaining of
sovereignty seems to have paralleled these two processes, taking place under foreign
supervision and marked by various key events leading up to reunification in 1990. The
presentation of the occupation statute to representatives of the Federal Republic implied
that, despite the founding of a new German state, the nation had not regained sovereignty
immediately after the war (Haftendorn, 14). German rearmament eventually indicated a
first step towards sovereignty. The question of rearmament solidified differing goals and
priorities for the parties involved: for Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, rearmament meant a
basis for sovereignty, counterbalancing armament in the East, and an institutionalization
of European military forces. Cautious about a potential rise of Germany as a major
military power, France objected to Germany’s entry into the NATO. The United States,
pushing for this entry, sought to strengthen Europe’s military force and eventually
reached a compromise for Germany to contribute outside of the NATO realm
(Haftendorn, 23, 26). This compromise between national and international interests in the
establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty of 1952 demonstrated
that Germany’s recurring pursuit of autonomy could take place only within the context of
European institutions. This rather self-contradictory fact was enforced in the General
Treaty of 1955 that initially granted the state its partial sovereignty: the United States,
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France, and Britain maintained certain rights for influence in Germany and, with them,
the state’s “semi-sovereign” nature until 1990 (Wittlinger, 13, 2013).
The EDC Treaty and the General Treaty lead to opposition on the German
domestic stage and revealed a general aversion to militarism: the culture of postwar
German foreign policy was marked by a sense of overcorrection, to counteract the former
striving for power (Machtversessenheit) through self-restraint and even an ”oblivion of
power (Machtvergessenheit)” (Wittlinger, 13). This conscious shift in approaching
foreign affairs contradicted the security needs of the republic’s allies. Germany’s entry
into the NATO in 1955 further complicated this contradiction. The lack of domestic
support for rearmament was complemented by an abundance of responsibilities towards a
variety of critical partners and regions, a dilemma posed by the central location of
Germany in Europe. NATO membership brought forth three distinct but opposing roles
that Henning Tewes described as influences on German priorities in international
security: the “Atlanticist” role emphasized on Germany’s responsibility to enforce U.S.
security interests while the “Gaullist” approach would prioritize a pivot towards Europe
(Tewes, 2002, 7). These two objectives intertwined in Germany’s military and economic
integration into the West (Westbindung). The “Muscovite” role, however, indicated a
need to refocus foreign policy towards the East, a route taken in Chancellor Willy
Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Tewes, 7).

Between Transatlantic Relations and European Integration
Germany’s reemergence on the international stage has demonstrated two major
mechanisms that have resulted in the challenges and opportunities of transatlantic
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security in the present. First, Europe has become more integrated. As established in the
previous section, this integration commenced on the foundation of economic and security
interests and specialized institutions and has now evolved as a broader, overarching
cultural and political institution. While Germany has gained its full sovereignty, it has
gained it under the condition of integration. This new interconnectedness comes along
with mutual responsibilities in the security realm. Second, the integration of Europe and
full sovereignty of Germany has decreased the functionality of U.S. influence in
European security affairs (Zimmerman, 2005, 143). While Germany carries emerging
responsibilities towards European institutions, it has faced the challenge of balancing
these responsibilities with the interests of its symbolic and historical partnership with the
United States. This balancing is complicated by the observation that the two mechanisms
have caused irreconcilable values and priorities in international security between Europe
and the United States to be more likely to surface. These conditions have intensified the
diplomatic crisis over NSA surveillance programs.
As analysis in Chapter 4 will show, the NSA scandal has confirmed the remaining
existence of these mechanisms. Even though the Internet poses a security concern for
both, the United States and European countries, contradicting definitions of threats and
different priorities have polarized both sides on the issue. While Germany’s security
priority—the protection of privacy—aligns with the priorities shared with the rest of
continental Europe, the United States has militarized cyberspace as a response to
perceived cyber security threats by terrorist groups. The exaggeration of U.S. policies
pertaining to the regulation of the Internet has continued the trend of conflicts of the last
two decades that have demonstrated an irreconcilable American exceptionalism in
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involvement in European security. Before analyzing the diplomatic and policy
background of this recent scandal, I will expand on the debates on Germany’s foreign
policy trends and the mechanisms surrounding its relationships with European institutions
and the United States. This analysis will place the recent cyber surveillance issue within
the broader context of transatlantic relations and European integration.
Out of the two mechanisms described above grew several theories about the
nature of the new unified German state. Debates focused on the ways in which the
context of intergovernmental institutions, the presence of the past, and national identity
had shaped Germany’s foreign and security policy objectives. Would Germany take on
greater responsibilities and how would it prioritize its obligations towards the United
States and Europe? Were there incentives for a new sense of German exceptionalism? In
analyzing the reconstruction of post-war Europe, optimists have projected the image of “a
Germany tamed by international ties” (Markovits; Reich, 1997, 44-45). This conclusion
is grounded in arguments ranging from Germany’s collective memory and prevention of
future abuses of power to economic interests in European integration and the
impossibility of a sustainable balance of power in a disintegrated Europe (44). These
arguments consider the European Union as an institution constraining the use of power
and, more importantly, an institution incentivizing Germany to prioritize economic
growth over relative power.
While

the

pessimists

acknowledge

Germany’s

legal

obligations

to

intergovernmental institutions, they believe that these multilateral structures serve as a
new ground for German exercise of power (Markovits; Reich, 50). They argue that the
introduction of a European-wide currency happened on the terms of German interests:

24

specific requirements on state debt, for instance, suited only the already dominant state of
the German economy (51). In addition, they refer to a report by CDU / CSU
parliamentary leader Wolfgang Schäuble who noted that Germany and France were to
fuel the project of European integration, with all other countries having to adapt to the
standard of economic progress imposed by the core states (51). The pessimists believe,
therefore, that the new structural and economic landscape of Europe allows Germany to
redefine its control over its neighbors—the desire of power still exists and the Federal
Republic has found new ways of channeling its exercise in peaceful ways (52). Along
with economic power, the state has increasingly exercised cultural power in Eastern
Europe, a newly accessible territory for German influence (50).
In the realm of competing theories in international relations, the perspective of
Germany as a civilian power had gained increasing popularity leading up to and
immediately following reunification (Dettke, 2009, 5). Hanns W. Maull, one of the most
prominent advocates of this theory, referred to the “’civilising’ of international relations,”
the process by which nations project domestic democratic values onto international
organizations and regimes (Harnisch; Maull, 2001, 3). The theory is closely linked to
liberalism—it anticipates the need for regulating individual state sovereignty as states
increasingly rely on multilateral agreements to protect themselves (Tewes, 10-13). As a
consequence, it values the creation of interdependent and cooperative security
communities in which military force serves merely self-defense or the promotion of
democracy—two concepts that may cause several contradictions (Tewes, 12). This last
point resolves, however, the commonly held belief that the civilian power paradigm is a
pacifist one (12). The multilateral approach to security in this argument assumes that a
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state would forgo national interest or even its sovereignty for the objective of civilizing
international systems (Maull, 4).
This process has been, according to its supporters, the driving force behind
decision-making in German foreign policy. Since reunification, several foreign policy
issues have been at the center of focus, ranging from Germany’s work on nuclear
nonproliferation to its stance on Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In general, supporters of
the civilian power theory such as Andrei Markovits and Simon Reich point to the fact
that Germany abstained from responsibility in security affairs despite its significant
economic power, redefining the concept of German exceptionalism (Markovits; Reich,
1997, 206). The exceptionalism of the Third Reich derived from its exercise of power in
Europe; the one of the post-war period, on the contrary, marked a willful neglect of
power and a shifting of responsibility towards the international stage (Markovits; Reich,
206).
Markovits and Reich’s argument gains significance particularly with regards to
the early stages of German militarism after unification. The question of German
involvement in the First Gulf War brought forth several contradictions in the nation’s use
of force and its relationships with its allies. Nina Philippi points out that Germany,
focusing on growing the economy of the unified state, had not yet acknowledged the rise
of new types of security challenges after the fall of the Soviet Union. The idea of smaller
military operations had been undermined by the fear of another world war, leading
foreign policy experts to condemn the use of force in Iraq (Philippi, 2001, 50-51). At the
same time, the voices against the Gulf War on the domestic front were mainly targeted at
the international community and meant to establish Germany’s open aversion to military
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use (51). Even though nations such as Israel and France had previously feared and
opposed German rearmament, they now condemned the state’s passiveness in Iraq and
questioned its commitment to the security community (52). Philippi argues that especially
Germany’s opposition against military use in Iraq and general hesitation leading up to
Kosovo complicated Hanns Maull’s depiction of Germany as a civilian power (63f.). In
reference to Germany’s secondary role in Western security affairs, she argues that, “an
ideal type Civilian Power would not always stand in the second row but be a global
player who actively tries to foster its civilising tasks . . . The ‘power-element’ within the
Civilian Power model is therefore underdeveloped” (65).
The debate over the Gulf War in 1990-91, therefore, demonstrated the
contradiction within the civilian power stance for Germany: cooperation often
contradicted domestic values regarding security and Germany’s integration into
international organizations would be complicated through the changing security demands
of the international community. The Gulf War case also demonstrated a shift in
international expectations. Philippi’s argument shows that the reconciliation of World
War II could not occur simply through German pacifism and a commitment to selfdefense in the realm of NATO. Instead, Germany was increasingly expected to match its
economic power in security matters, an observation that aligns with Markovits and
Reich’s statement on a new German exceptionalism. Rather than holding on to a pacifist
stance, Germany would have to reconcile its past through a commitment to its allies’
security objectives, regardless if this commitment came in the form of military
contribution. Germany’s reemergence as an actor in international security consequently
required the adaptation to a new international order and a redefinition of how the nation
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would reconcile its past. These changes meant that the administrations had to undermine
existing cultural values and overcome contradictions on the domestic front to effectively
integrate into a cooperative security community.
Despite these challenges in German foreign policy, supporters of the Civilian
Power model applied their theory to interpret the nation’s decisions in international
security. Henning Tewes, for instance, argues that NATO enlargement in 1994
exemplified a case of German civilian power: the administration supported the inclusion
of Eastern European states into NATO under the condition that it would not impair
Germany’s relationship with Russia (Tewes, 2001, 19). The spread of democracy
presented the main incentive for enlargement, demonstrating the nation’s interest in
incorporating its democratic values in intergovernmental organizations (19). This careful
consideration of both cooperation with Russia and broadening the scope of NATO as not
only a security but also democratic community seemed to highlight Germany’s role as a
civilian power (20). However, this rather cautious approach can also be interpreted as a
balancing of conflicting national and international interest and an internal debate over
Germany’s identity in security affairs. The enlargement of NATO represented further
integration of security ties in Europe—an idea the United States generally supported. The
acknowledgment of cooperation with Russia, which was grounded in economic interests,
showed the dichotomy of Germany’s simultaneous reemergence in the global economy
and international security. The civilian power model, in this case, relies too heavily on
the idea of sacrifice for the sake of integration and cooperation. It overlooks the idea that
conflicting economic and security interests shaped the contemplation over NATO
enlargement.
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The contradictions brought forth during the period of the First Gulf War and
NATO Enlargement debate manifested in the question on a normalization of German
power. The civilian power perspective had dominated this question—its link to liberalism
and support of the idea that Germany would not follow its national interest in security
affairs lead observers to believe in a remaining German exceptionalism. Germany’s
pacifism and unwillingness to take on greater responsibilities only perpetuated the view
that Germany had not been normalized. The false interpretations of the civilian power
model as a pacifist one made it seem irreconcilable with normalization.
Military intervention in Kosovo posed a first step to reconciling this conflict.
While critics argued that German military intervention in Kosovo was a reaction to
outside forces—the United States had pressured the newly elected administration under
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer into a quick
decision—Hanns Maull attributes German involvement to a combination of domestic and
international forces. While international expectations did pressure Germany into taking
action, the administration had its own agenda in making a decision in favor of the use of
force (Maull, 2001, 118). First, Germany had an interest in maintaining the legitimacy of
the international institutions involved. Having learned from the experience of the first
Gulf War and since developed an open-mindedness for military force, the German public
increasingly accepted Germany’s commitment to NATO, the EU, and the UN through the
use of force; a development that gave Schröder and Fischer the domestic support to act
instantly (Maull, 117). Second, Maull argues that “deeply held beliefs and norms” about
Germany’s responsibility to prevent further genocides made intervention in Kosovo
indispensible (118). He concludes that, despite the shift towards military use, Germany
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strengthened its positions as a civilian power as it projected its democratic values onto
cooperation within international institutions (120).
Maull’s reliance on underlying norms and values becomes problematic in light of
the inconsistency in German foreign policy decisions. Following Germany’s abstention to
provide military aid to Libya, The Economist published an article titled “The
unadventurous eagle” in 2011, noting that the central European country was alienating
itself from its traditional allies in Europe and across the Atlantic. The author argued that
the nation entered a new trend of following German exceptionalism, no longer being
invested in its multilateral agreements and former partnerships. Hanns Maull contributed
with the observation that Germany lacked a “grand strategy” (Economist, 2011). Since
this alienation posed an issue since the first Gulf War, it is arguable that the concept of
German exceptionalism is a recent development. Yet, the inconsistencies in foreign
policy decisions seem to support the idea of exceptionalism and complicate the civilian
power model. If Germany were still or had ever been a civilian power, would it not have
developed a clear “grand strategy”? In fact, the civilian power paradigm represents a
grand strategy in itself. Germany’s inconsistencies, therefore, prove the theory as
insufficient in fully explaining the nation’s foreign policy behavior.

Normalization, Sovereignty, and Transatlantic Relations
The civilian power theory had persisted throughout the postwar period and the
first decade after unification because German values and public interest largely aligned
with the integration into the West and development of multilateral agreements.
Germany’s recent alienation from its allies has revived arguments of a special path and
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the country’s inability to form long-term alliances. To some, however, this alienation
does not represent a special path for Germany. Instead, it renders support to the idea that
Germany has become a normal power.
Normalization in international affairs, specifically in the case of Germany, has
been subject of change and multiple different definitions (Dettke, 21). Since the end of
the Second World War, international expectations of German reconciliation have put the
issues of reparations and responsibility for war crimes at the center of normalization. In
this context, normalization required reconciliation with Germany’s neighboring countries,
former Soviet nations, and the support of the autonomy of Israel. According to Dieter
Dettke, reconciliation was a problematic definition for normalization: while Germany
demonstrated its willingness and efforts for reconciliation through reparations and
compensation programs, the insufficiency of these concessions to reconcile the past
would indicate that Germany would “remain imprisoned in its past” (21). Even the idea
of pacifism did not provide an adequate moral standard for reconciliation as both military
actions as well as inaction entail ethical problems (21). The evaluation of normalcy,
therefore, had to reach beyond the complicated boundaries of reconciliation.
As post-war Germany was a semi-sovereign state, the regaining of sovereignty
and reemergence as an autonomous actor in international relations play a significant role
in defining normalization. Germany’s and particularly Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s
campaign against the Iraq War in 2002-03 has become a major point of contention with
regards to this reemergence. Some projected the Civilian Power model onto the decision
to abstain from the use of force in Iraq—the decision demonstrated the country’s
hesitation regarding out-of-area operations and reconfirmed its striving for a special path
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and a commitment to pacifism (Zimmermann, 2005, 128). Germany’s goal of building a
coalition in the U.N. Security Council that would serve as a counterbalance to American
influence seemed to support this perspective. However, Dieter Dettke argues that the
stance taken by Chancellor Schroeder’s administration was rooted in the principle of
following national interest and autonomy (Dettke, 7).
While many realist scholars saw the German-American tension over Iraq as a
long-lasting division between German and American security policy, Dettke argues that
based on modern realism, particularly defensive structural realism, Germany’s more
aggressive behavior in following its national interest does not necessarily imply a
structural alienation from the United States or Europe. Instead, it “anticipates that hardline policies focusing on political and military competition lead to self-defeating
consequences” (Dettke, 14). This argumentation implies that nations maximize on their
ability to enforce their own policies but acknowledge the limits presented to them by the
structures of power and multilateral agreements. The debate over German normalcy thus
also includes the question whether normalization would mean the end of GermanAmerican relations or German-European relations as they have existed since the end of
World War II.
Other evaluations of normalcy focus on policy-interests and the specific roles
states take on to exercise these interests. Hubert Zimmerman, for instance, argues that
Germany’s reemergence on the international stage has brought forth a new dynamic in
German-American relations:
“To an extent unprecedented in the postwar era, Germany and the United States
now pursue structurally similar international policies. Since the end of the Cold
War, Germany has become an exporter of security abroad, whereas previously it
had been an importer of security from the United States. Thus the fundamental
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policy objectives and policy tools of the United States and Germany in the
international system are becoming more alike, as both seek to address security
threats by intervening abroad – politically, economically, and militarily”
(Zimmermann, 129).
This theory relies on a historical evaluation of the evolution of German foreign
policy. The global power structure in the post-war era caused the necessity and,
consequently, the acceptance of American hegemony in security policy in Europe. The
counterbalancing of Soviet power, in Zimmermann’s terms, represented a “burdensharing” that exceeded the boundaries of international security—it pertained to the
economic, political, and arguably the cultural development of the Western alliance. The
concept of “importing” or “consuming” security is based on a business-related model that
indicates an exchange of security and protection on the one hand, and an
acknowledgment of leadership and long-term hegemony on the other. The factor of
sovereignty plays an important role in this exchange. The acknowledgment of U.S.
hegemony specifically in Germany represented an acknowledgment of the semisovereign nature of the West-German state. American hegemony meant military presence
in Germany and throughout Europe and special rights of oversight of German foreign and
domestic policy by the allies. While this oversight, as previously discussed, decreased in
formality, it remained in the way of a complete reemergence—or normalization—of
German foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, which arguably marked the end of
the European need for American protection. Accordingly, for as long as Germany
remained an “importer of security,” sovereignty was dispensable—the business model
presented a fair solution to the “burden-sharing” in the West.
Zimmermann’s theory also suggests that normalcy is measurable by the degree to
which a country’s policy interests and their enforcement align with the general foreign
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policy behavior and consensus of other states within its alliance. In the case of Germany,
Zimmermann refers to its use of military force in the Kosovo War; a decision that marked
the beginning or a first major test of Germanys “exporter role” in international security,
though preceded by several smaller steps of intervention and stabilizing measures in the
area (141). Over the years, Zimmermann argues, the European Union had played a key
role in stabilizing Eastern Europe with the export of security to Bosnia, Kosovo, and
Macedonia, resulting in a transformative foreign policy role for the union as a whole
(141). Germany showed its leadership in providing stability in these particular regions
despite the rather limiting perspective of the civilian power theory. Zimmermann
concludes that Europe’s and Germany’s leadership in Eastern Europe has transformed the
role not only of Europe but also of the United States: if more European countries
demonstrate their capacity to provide stability, “the functional basis for asymmetrical US
leadership of the Atlantic partnership is gone” (143).
These observations suggest that the transatlantic relationship finds itself in a
transitional phase in which European powers, including Germany, have achieved
normalcy through “exporting” stability. The challenge of this transitional phase,
according to David Andrews, is a newly gained sense of freedom by which the United
States determines its actions. During the Cold War, the constant threat of the Soviet
Union required a unified counterbalance of power in the West. Even though the United
States took on the leadership role of exporting security to Europe, it relied on the support
of European states in security affairs. The crisis in transatlantic relations of the last
decade, initiated by the War on Terror and the Iraq War in 2002, has demonstrated that
the United States no longer depends on long-term support from its European allies
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(Andrews, 2005, 69). At the time the United States began its course of fighting terrorism
and lobbying for international support, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
spoke of “’floating coalitions of countries’” and stated that, “’the mission will define the
coalition – not the other way around’” (Zimmermann, 144). With this statement, he
contrasted the current constellation of U.S. allies with the long-term partnership that was
once formed for a common overarching goal. The statement also shows the willingness of
the United States to act upon the newly gained freedom of building short-term coalitions
and even face the risk of enforcing national interest by itself. Addressing the recent
surveillance scandal, Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore refer to the United States as a
“hypocritical hegemon” whose policies have often been tolerated and legitimized because
of the international system and values it has generated in the last century (Farrell,
Finnemore, 2013, 2). Hypocrisy, in this context, has been an essential tool for the United
States to operate within this system (2). This argument confirms the idea that the United
States can no longer rely on support from its allies based on its higher moral ground.
Instead, there needs to exist a real incentive for cooperation between the U.S. and its
allies who decreasingly “benefit from the global public goods Washington provides” (3).
The transitional phase of the transatlantic relationship is consequently characterized by a
disconnect between the lack of functionality of U.S. influence on European security
policy and the sense of freedom of the United States to enforce its policy interests in
short-term coalitions.
The cyber surveillance scandal and the relatively new challenge of cyber security
have confirmed the existence of this disconnect. While states—including Germany—
have an interest in using cyberspace as a means of security, there is a lack of equality in
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determining the extent to which they should regulate and control data. Additionally,
direct threats in cyberspace—especially terrorist-related attacks—have not yet been as
pronounced to incentivize and legitimize the degree of protective measures the United
States has implemented. Having put these surveillance programs in place, however, the
United States has acted upon its ability to follow its national security interests without
seeking long-term coalitions. The lack of transparency in cyberspace has facilitated this
process. Regardless of the extent to which other states such as Germany were aware of
the program, the United States has acquired the technological capacity to establish its
hegemony in a shared space.
The business model of importing security and acknowledging hegemony therefore
no longer adequately addresses the circumstances of power and roles from a European
perspective. The scandal has brought forth clear objectives and values European states,
especially Germany, are aiming to project onto their regulation of cyberspace.
Sovereignty, with regard to cyber surveillance, manifests itself not only in the control of
data but also in the degree to which states can enforce their values onto regulation of the
Internet. The United States has, in Farrell and Finnemore’s terms, exercised its
sovereignty by enforcing its values in international security in a yet relatively unregulated
and largely undivided space and thereby undermined the sovereignty of others. In this
case, however, strongly held values and sensibility regarding privacy and data protection
make the exchange between sovereignty and protection too costly.
With regard to normalization, the cyber surveillance case has solidified the idea
that German normalization—a more leveled playing ground in international security—is
inevitably linked to the United States. The mechanism of Germany’s reemergence as an
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autonomous actor and simultaneous decline of American influence on its security policy
implies a remaining German dependence on the United States: even though Germany has
reestablished itself as an “exporter of security,” and taken on new roles and
responsibilities since reunification, the United States has maintained its expectation of the
transatlantic relationship—that it provides security for the price of hegemony. The final
step in German normalization consequently depends on a redefinition of the role of the
United States in transatlantic security. In the following chapter, I will analyze how the
new dilemma of sovereignty and American hegemony in transatlantic relations has
revealed itself in the diplomacy- and policy-related issues of the NSA scandal.

4. Germany and Cyber Security
A Symbolic Scandal
When Edward Snowden leaked information on surveillance programs conducted
by the NSA in 2013, the transatlantic relationship was already facing several ongoing
challenges. The scandal threatened to interrupt ongoing and already contentious talks on
a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union called the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). As the United States and
Germany had previously experienced tension over German military action in Libya, to
which the German government abstained despite pressure from both the United States
and Europe, they now faced a similar situation with regards to Syria. U.S. Secretary of
State John Kerry and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle disagreed on the
question of providing arms to Syrian rebels, with Mr. Westerwelle remaining cautious

37

and suggesting to follow the course of the conflict. Despite their collaborative diplomatic
measures against the Russian government, which stood in the way of peace talks in Syria,
their disagreement added to the recurring tension in transatlantic cooperation in
international security. On top of these points of contention, which had occurred in a long
string of events leading to alienation on both sides, the summer of 2013 was of historic
and symbolic significance—it marked the 50th anniversary of President Kennedy’s
speech in Berlin in 1963. In commemoration of the speech that most explicitly tied the
people of Berlin and Germany as a whole to the guiding values and worldview of the
United States, President Obama was invited to speak in Berlin in June 2013.
In the midst of all these circumstances, the surveillance scandal combined several
significant facets and layers of contention in German-American relations and solidified
core issues pertaining to cultural and political values, economic aspects, and the question
of leadership in security affairs. Even though cyber surveillance and data privacy will
continuously impose an important policy challenge on these countries, the NSA scandal
by itself appeared first and foremost as a symbolic scandal, representing deeper
fundamental challenges to be overcome in the future. The progression of the scandal—
the interaction between different levels on the German domestic front and their changing
reactions to the revelations—has demonstrated this observation. The neutrality and
silence of Merkel’s administration contradicted the public outrage at first. Having relied
on rather symbolic acts of investigating the issue, the administration showed a stronger
stance when the scandal pertained to Chancellor Merkel herself. The tapping of her
phone—even though not significantly adding to the scope of NSA spying—reinforced
and intensified the symbolic image of Germany as a subject of security. While public
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concern about Germany’s involvement in cyber surveillance showed its aversion to
Germany as a major actor in international security, Merkel’s outrage over the image of a
subject of security solidified a contradiction in priorities between public and government
interest. The progression of the scandal, therefore, highlighted symbolic representations
of pacifism within the German public on the one hand, and the desire of the government
for more autonomy and trust in security affairs on the other.
The revelation of NSA spying in the summer of 2013 brought forth strong
reactions across the entire political spectrum in Germany. As newspapers reported,
Germany was the main target of the NSA, creating a rift of trust in the transatlantic
relationship (DW, 2013). Taking place in the middle of political campaigns for the
federal elections in September, the issue became highly politicized. Initial reactions
seemed to solidify the common stance that Germany had the responsibility to investigate
the issue. Some officials even suggested imposing pressure on the U.S. administration by
pausing talks regarding a new transatlantic trade agreement or refusing to pass along
passenger information of flights headed towards the United States (Zeit, 2013). Others
pleaded for German and European support for Edward Snowden and introduced the idea
of granting him asylum in Germany. They referred to the OSCE and the Council of
Europe who had preexisting regulations on the support of whistleblowers (DW, Spiegel,
2013).
Despite all these reactions, Chancellor Angela Merkel seemed to avoid the topic
altogether and hesitated to take a stance in the issue. Instead of confronting the Obama
administration, she sent representatives to the United States to investigate the degree to
which the NSA spied on German citizens, the government, and private corporations. In
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mid-July, Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich of the Christian Social Union (CSU) met
with U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden, Attorney General Eric Holder, and chief counterterrorism advisor Lisa Monaco. He stated that the U.S. representatives acknowledged the
German need for privacy and increased transparency in the surveillance process between
the two governments. To enable further cooperation, the NSA would begin a
“declassification process.” Additionally, Friedrich was assured that the U.S. was not
engaging in economic espionage. The interior minister concluded that the NSA
surveillance program is quite focused on targeting specific data on terrorist attacks,
organized crime, and non-proliferation. As a response to the minister’s optimistic report
of his meeting, the opposition criticized his diplomatic approach. Stating that the meeting
did not meet the expectation of receiving detailed information on the surveillance
program, the SPD and the Greens characterized it as a mere attempt to showcase concern
(DW, 2013). Friedrich’s visit turned into a highly politicized event, employed by the
opposition to accuse the Chancellor and her party for downplaying the scandal.
Similar accusations followed a hearing with Merkel’s Chief of Staff Ronald
Pofalla in front of the intelligence committee at the end of July. The committee chairman
concluded that the hearing had not resulted in any progress. Statements by Pofalla rather
complicated the declassification process, which other government officials demanded.
According to Pofalla, the German intelligence community had not been involved in NSA
spying and he assured that, with regards to cyber security, the secret service had
exercised within the realm of the German legal system (DW, 2013). This statement
seemed to downplay the capabilities of the German foreign intelligence service, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), which is one of the few of its kind in the world that,
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according to a Spiegel article in June 2013, had invested in information technology for
surveillance purposes. The article suggested that greater control of Internet activities has
become one of the major priorities of Gerhard Schindler, the head of the BND who
announced in 2012 a plan to invest 133 million dollars in the surveillance department
(Spiegel, 2013). Interior Minister Friedrich supported this plan by emphasizing the need
for a presence of German authorities in cyberspace and the opportunities the Internet
entails for criminals. These goals in the intelligence community demonstrated a lack of
technological capacity rather than a lack of incentive: even though legally cleared to
collect 20 percent of data from foreign Internet traffic, the BND supposedly had the
capacity to regulate only a much smaller percentage (Spiegel, 2013).
Regardless of the extent to which the government collaborated with the NSA on
its surveillance program, the existence of surveillance measures on a smaller scale
through programs at the German foreign intelligence service (BND) showcase the
German government’s interest in or even security need for surveillance of cyberspace.
The legal and technological limitations of the BND, however, indicate that Germany
could not achieve sufficient regulation of the Internet by itself. Consequently, a gap
existed and still exists between security needs and the measures that could possibly be
enacted; a gap possibly filled by U.S. intelligence. Since revelations about Prism began,
U.S. officials have released several reports regarding the number of terrorist attacks
prevented through the collection of data. In a hearing in front of the House of
Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of the NSA General Keith
Alexander reported that the analysis of data through NSA surveillance had prevented 50
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potential terrorist attacks globally since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (DW,
2013). Several of these attacks were supposedly prevented on German soil.
Individual reports also suggested cooperation on an EU-wide level: according to
information gathered by the Financial Times, representatives of the Obama
administration had lobbied for a loosening of privacy laws in Europe (FT, 2013). The
lobbying efforts targeted the “anti-Fisa clause,” which would have arguably restricted
NSA spying on European citizens (FT). This clause, in addition to the silence of the
government, raised suspicions among German citizens: according to a poll at the time, 87
percent believed that German security agencies had been aware of the NSA spying
program while over three quarters also suspected that the government had been involved
(SZ, 2013). What supported these suspicions was the relative silence of the Social
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) despite its leadership role in the opposition. Since
the NSA program was said to date back to the time the previous administration was in
place, a coalition government between the SPD and Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
critics would have traced back policies to former and current SPD leaders. In fact, the
SPD supported surveillance-related policies in 2005, resulting in Chancellor candidate
Peer Steinbrück remaining silent about the scandal (DW, 2013).
Chancellor Merkel reiterated General Alexander’s argument about the need for
surveillance throughout the beginning phase of the scandal (Zeit, 2013). Her initial
defense of NSA surveillance demonstrated her acknowledgment of American hegemony
on the one hand, and the need to convey a functional value of American protection on the
other. As debates over the legal aspects of cyber surveillance surfaced and suspicion
about a possible cooperation increased, public reactions dismissed the idea of American
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protection and prioritized German security interests in cyberspace—the protection of
privacy. At a moment in which the scope of NSA spying was quite ambiguous, the
Chancellor was more open to the idea of balancing German and American interests
through a balance between security and civil liberties. Since only symbolic actions were
taken and investigations of the issue delayed, the initial reaction of Ms. Merkel’s
administration suggested that there still exists a certain degree of acceptance of and
interest in American protection.
The major policy debate regarding the scandal revolved around the appropriate
balance between security and privacy. This debate took place specifically in the United
States as the government had to address the specific concerns about security threats and
their implications for privacy in cyberspace. For Chancellor Merkel, however, the
contradiction in policy interests also pertained to domestic affairs, the upcoming federal
election, and Germany’s relationship with the United States. While President Obama’s
administration faced the task of balancing security and privacy, Merkel’s initial obstacle
was the balance between maintaining the transatlantic relationship and satisfying the
public’s expectation of a strong German stance in the issue. At the beginning of the
scandal, she remained in the background of negotiating this balance. Having
acknowledged the need for privacy, she emphasized transatlantic cooperation in cyber
surveillance for the security of German citizens. In an interview with Die Zeit, she
defended the idea of cyber surveillance, stressing that the regulation and security of
cyberspace are parallel concepts. The balance between security and privacy should be an
ongoing debate, as technological capacities and the security needs of the state constantly
change. In this context, it would be inescapable that the intelligence services of different
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governments collaborate to exchange information. Her major point behind backing
security measures in the Internet was her reminder that the United States has been
Germany’s closest ally, and that German unification had come along with a relationship
of trust and cooperation in security affairs (Zeit, 2013). She rejected parallels of the NSA
with the East German Stasi, stressing that such comparisons understated the severity of
Stasi operations (Zeit, 2013).
Interior Minister Friedrich took a similar stance on the topic: in an interview with
Spiegel leading up to his visit to Washington, he assured the public of his plans to voice
the privacy concerns but highlighted that anti-American sentiments were “unfair” due to
the lack of information on the NSA operations (Spiegel, 2013). His approach to the
meeting relied on his trust in the transatlantic partnership as he expected an open
conversation “among friends;” referring to a long-standing cooperative relationship that
would have to prove itself in the coming weeks and months (Spiegel). He rather avoided
the question on NSA spying in EU affiliated institutions and redirected the focus towards
the lack of evidence and significance of cooperation between the United States and
Germany. Both Merkel and Friedrich, therefore, maintained quite passive and reconciling
voices as media coverage, criticism from the opposition, and public outrage unfolded
throughout the weeks.
Their statements also reflect the historical component and how pre-existing
perceptions of German autonomy vis-à-vis the United States were projected onto cyber
security. The symbolism of the transatlantic relationship and the upcoming 50th
anniversary celebration of President Kennedy’s Berlin speech provided an incentive for
neutrality and patience. By rejecting comparisons between the NSA and the Stasi and by
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reinforcing the value of German-American relations not only in security affairs but also
in the evolution of German sovereignty, Merkel drew attention to a part of German
history that seems to polarize public opinion. Table 1 shows the results of a poll by the
German Marshall Fund following the scandal. The survey seeks to capture European and
American views on future cooperation or independence in security affairs (Stelzenmüller;
Raicher, 2013). 44 percent of Germans surveyed believed that Germany should distance
itself from the United States and take a more independent approach to security policy.
While only 15 percent answered in favor of closer collaboration, a third of the surveyed
stated the balance between independence and collaboration should remain about the
same. This outcome shows the polarization of opinions on U.S. foreign policy in
Germany, which is supported by the fact that only 7 percent abstained from deciding
among these three options.

Table 1: Should EU/US partnership in security/diplomacy become closer, remain about the same or should the EU/US
take a more independent approach from the US/EU?
Countries
GB
1047
1047

France
1051
1051

Germany
1056
1056

USA
1054
1054

Sweden
1017
1017

Become Closer

134
13%

282
27%

159
15%

253
24%

234
23%

Remain about the same

370
35%

242
23%

355
34%

294
28%

264
26%

Take a more independent
approach

275
26%

348
33%

464
44%

239
23%

321
32%

Don’t know

268
26%

179
17%

78
7%

268
25%

198
19%

Unweighted
Weighted

Adopted from Stelzenmüller/Raicher, GMF (2013)

The polarization also reflects Germany’s unique position within the European Union. A
stronger tendency towards a more independent approach implies a desire for more
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autonomy and the incentive to use the new security realm of cyberspace to exercise more
power and dissolve the current power structures in transatlantic relations.
The mechanism of European integration, however, revealed the limitations of
Germany’s scope of action. As public opinion showed the willingness for more
autonomy, Chancellor Merkel’s pleading for international cooperation and shifting of the
debate onto the European level demonstrates the state’s dependence on the European
Union to achieve its security objectives (SZ, 2013). As the scandal had revolved around
the contentious German-American relationship, Merkel managed to overcome this
pressure by charging the European Union with more responsibility regarding data
protection. This strategic shift represented an opportunity to demonstrate German
leadership in Europe on the one hand, and the interrelatedness between GermanAmerican and European-American relations on the other. At the same time, the shift
towards the European Union confirms that European integration serves as a
counterbalance to American hegemony. Even though Germany is seeking a more active
role in transatlantic security, this role seems to require the legitimization through working
within the boundaries of European institutions. Accordingly, Chancellor Merkel’s
administration refused to take on an exceptional role in the scandal by, for instance,
inviting Snowden to testify on NSA surveillance. This hesitation contradicts the
exceptional role Germany played as the major target of the surveillance program, which
would have legitimized a more active investigation.
Revelations of the tapping of Angela Merkel’s private and official cell phones
released in October 2013, despite the ambiguity of the sources at the time, dramatically
ceased the German government’s reconciliation efforts. Having reinforced the need for
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surveillance for security purposes during President Obama’s visit, Chancellor Merkel and
other officials openly voiced their doubt in the current state of the transatlantic
relationship (NYT, 2013). While Ms. Merkel had previously joked about not being aware
of being the victim of spying herself, she now confronted the U.S. President regarding the
allegations just a few months later. Her sudden shift in responding to the scandal and
taking initiative resulted in criticism from the German public and her opposition; a minor
challenge that emerged after her successful reelection as Chancellor. The change in tone
also raised the question why Ms. Merkel chose to react specifically at this point. Critics
argued that the unlawfulness of NSA spying had been proven months before, when the
media first revealed the content of Edward Snowden’s documents.
The shift in Ms. Merkel’s stance originated from the symbolic value the new
revelations held to Germany’s autonomy as an actor in international security. The
investment in surveillance programs through the BND demonstrated Germany’s
acknowledgment of security threats in the Internet. Since the BND lacked the
technological capacity of implementing a sufficient regulatory cyber security program, it
also acknowledged the need for collaboration with the United States. While the BND or
the government might not have been aware of the scope of the NSA surveillance
programs, it must have cooperated on the implementation of its own program. Chancellor
Merkel remained in the background throughout the beginning of the scandal. Despite
reassuring the German public of the need for privacy, she laid more emphasis on the
value of cyber security. With this inactivity, she actively risked her domestic support in a
critical time during her electoral campaign to restore public trust in the transatlantic
relationship. She took the risk with the assumption that Germany and the United States
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had equally strong participation and a mutual dependence in ensuring the security of
cyberspace. The revelation of her victimization, however, removed this equal playing
field on which security measures were enforced. The NSA spying programs went beyond
the exchange of relevant data and revealed their sole foundation on U.S. security
interests. The threat of economic espionage on German corporations intensified this
perspective.
The scandal and its politicization, therefore, uncovered several issues of
contention pertaining to cyber surveillance. The protection of privacy and the
enforcement of security measures have traditionally been at the forefront of policy
debates pertaining to security in the Internet. Especially reactions from the German
public—the priority of pacifism and aversion to military involvement in cyberspace—
have demonstrated that the balance between privacy and security will remain a major
challenge. The symbolic aspect of and diplomatic responses to the scandal, however,
have revealed the need to reorganize the roles of individual governments in enforcing this
balance. The scope of the NSA programs has shown that autonomy in cyber security—
the ability to enforce one’s own security needs and views regarding privacy in
cyberspace—is determined through technological capacity. Chancellor Merkel’s shift in
reacting more dominantly consequently represents the acknowledgment of the Internet as
a valuable resource in the security realm on the one hand, and the need for an equal
playing field in utilizing this resource as a security measure on the other.
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Virtual Fear and Cyber Surveillance
The scandal brought forth the inevitable need for a more equal playing ground in
utilizing cyberspace as a resource for international security. The creation of this equal
playing ground requires an evaluation of the various security threats. Current evaluations,
however, mainly rely on speculation and a continuation of broader security strategies in
the realm of cyber security. Different policy responses reflect the priorities, values, and
security needs states ascribe to cyberspace and complicate the equal utilization of the
Internet as a security resource. A look at the legal and institutional structures pertaining
to cyber security and privacy reveal a strong divide in security objectives between the
United States and Europe. Even before the September 11 attacks, the Foreign Intelligence
Service Act (FISA) built the foundation for prioritizing the security of cyberspace
through regulation and surveillance over the protection of privacy. Subsequent changes in
the administration of intelligence services, along with more drastic legal changes after
9/11 amplified the exaggeration of security and intelligence in cyberspace. These events
have demonstrated the intensifying of an environment of fear and the value of gathering
data in the United States. In contrast, states in continental Europe, particularly Germany,
have—based on an evaluation of their legal systems—viewed the protection of privacy in
cyberspace as a security objective in itself. While possible collaboration with NSA
surveillance and the implementation of similar programs in Germany may indicate an
interest in cyber surveillance, the relationship between intelligence and privacy is by far
less out of balance as it is in the United States. The analysis of legal systems and
institutions provides an understanding of how individual states and their intelligence
services attempt to enforce their security objectives in a space that lacks international
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regulation. This understanding contributes to the overarching discussion on state
sovereignty in cyber security.
Cyber surveillance represents one of the many policy responses to cyber terrorism
and is the strategy for which the NSA has drawn public and international criticism in the
last year. James Gravelle notes that intelligence agencies have dramatically increased
their surveillance in recent years—a result of the fact that terrorists have quickly adapted
to the information revolution, now potentially having the capacity to employ more
advanced technology to disrupt the security of states (Gravelle, 111). As Gravelle puts
surveillance in the broader context of knowledge-management, he points out that this
process consists of several steps, ranging from the gathering of data to evaluation,
interpretation, and to information exchange with other organizations (113, 119). Even
though governments can extract useful information from data through the management of
knowledge and close evaluation of data, he notes that, “many organisations simply store
rather than process data. This mindset often over-focuses on the quantitative approach,
concerned with capturing figures and numbers. The second stage in the process is to
transform data into information” (113). Gravelle’s findings suggest that intelligence
services generally do not implement efficient programs to target specific information on
terrorist activity but are rather driven by an irrational exaggeration of security threats and
desire for perceived protection in the short-term.
The excessive focus on the quantity of data gathered reinforces the psychological
effects of speculative nature of cyber terrorism. Thomas suggests that online propaganda
and the wide variety of outlets for public messages allow terrorist groups to exaggerate
their scope of influence and actual size (Thomas, 115). This strategy, according to
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Thomas, “produces an atmosphere of virtual fear or virtual life. People are afraid of
things that are invisible and things they don’t understand” (115). Statements by Theresa
May, the British Home Secretary, from 2011 confirm Thomas’s argument: upon warning
against the growing sophistication of the technological knowledge of terrorist groups,
May specifically referred to al Qaeda, a group that supposedly called for “cyber-jihad”
(Awan, 21). For British and U.S. officials, possible vulnerabilities in cyber space and the
exaggeration of terrorists’ online presence have created an environment of fear that has
resulted in the transformation of cyber surveillance into a top priority in national security.
As Gravelle’s theory implies, this priority has manifested itself in the way in
which U.S. and British intelligence agencies conduct cyber surveillance. It has also
manifested itself in several institutional and policy changes that facilitate the
implementation of cyber surveillance and other security measures. The U.S. Air Force,
for instance, included cyberspace in its mission statement as one of its domains of
protection and established the Air Force Cyber Space Command in 2005 and 2006
respectively (Joyner, 2012, 163-64). Additionally, the United States Cyber Command—
lead by General Keith Alexander—was added to the Defense Department in 2010,
furthering the militarization of the Internet (164). Jason Healey argues that the
classification process initiated by General Alexander marked the beginning of an
imbalance between security and privacy in the United States; enabling the NSA to
enforce its security values onto cyberspace without government regulation: “Since
classification levels permitted few, if any, outside voices, the seeming consensus helped
convince U.S. policymakers to adopt General Alexander's ‘collect it all’ strategy and
create a new U.S. Cyber Command to streamline military cyber power” (Healey, 2013).
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The NSA case has demonstrated how classification and few institutional changes can
contribute to the militarization of cyberspace. The environment of uncertainty and semiimaginary understanding of a perceived security threat in cyberspace to which Patrick
Jagoda (2012) refers to as “Speculative Security” have legitimized excessive data
gathering by U.S. and British intelligence services. The governance of the NSA by
General Alexander has also confirmed Gravelle’s and Tim Read’s observation that
domestic and international cooperation among different institutions is crucial to
managing information and that the isolation of a particular organization can undermine
sovereignty and limit the efficiency of security measures (Gravelle, 119; Read, 2012,
159).

Data Protection in the United States and Germany
While the perceived threat originates from speculation, the security measures
have severe implications for the protection of privacy. The Foreign Intelligence Service
Act of 1978 and subsequent amendments perfectly exemplify these implications. FISA
represented an exceptional rule to criminal investigations: traditionally, the Fourth
Amendment protected U.S. citizens from unwarranted searches without probable cause.
FISA lowered the standards by which intelligence services were able to receive warrants;
a measure legitimized by the significance of foreign intelligence investigations (Jaeger,
Bertot, McClure, 2003, 297). Since put in place until the year 1999, the Foreign
Intelligence Service Court (FISC), overseeing the investigations under FISA, received
11,883 FISA warrants—all of them were granted (Jaeger et al., 297). Adding to the
already wide range of actions FISA granted intelligence services, the September 11
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attacks in 2001 brought forth the passing of the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“Patriot
Act”), which, according to Jaeger et al, increased this range of action (299-300). The
following table shows the ways in which the Patriot Act was expected to alter selected
regulations of the Foreign Intelligence Service Act:

Patriot Act (Section of Act)

Proposed Patriot II (Section of Draft)

Intelligence need only be a “significant”
purpose of an investigation (§ 218)

Expanded definitions of “foreign powers” (§§
101-102, 111)

Records now include any tangible thing that
could contain information (§ 215)
The secrecy clause prevents discussion of
investigations (§ 215)
Expanded use of roving wiretaps, pen registers,
and trap and trace devices (§§ 206-207, 214,
216)
Surveillance of electronic and voice mail
communications (§§ 209-210)

Subject of investigation need not be violating
federal law (§ 102)
Immunity for private entities that voluntary
provide information (§ 313)
Simplified access for investigators to credit and
financial information (§ 313)

Increased sharing of information from
investigations between agencies and levels of
government (§ 203)

Increased Attorney General powers to
authorize warrantless FISA investigations (§§
103-104)
Prohibition against the use of encryption
technologies (§ 404)
Further expansion of information sharing from
investigation between government agencies (§
105)

Table adopted from Jaeger et al., 2003, 299

While these laws have expanded the legal ground for intelligence services to
conduct surveillance, they lack the counterbalance of institutions or laws protecting the
privacy of all U.S. citizens. The Fourth Amendment, which confines the protection of
privacy to preventing home searches without probable cause, has built the constitutional
foundation for data protection in the United States. Since its framing is largely limited by
the physical space of the home, however; it has often been at the center of debate since
the United States has increasingly relied on information technology since the 1920s
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(Harper, 2006, 33). The Privacy Act of 1974 marked an adaptation to the privacy needs
of citizens in the information age, pertaining mostly to the maintaining of records and a
requirement for agencies to disclose purposes and means of record keeping (38).
However, the U.S. Justice Department, in an evaluation of the Privacy Act in 2004, noted
that its broad and ambiguous regulations complicate its application, making it rather
useless in adequately ensuring privacy (38). Harper notes that intelligence services still
maintain some freedom to overcome the citizen’s rights based on the lack of clarity in the
disclosure process: “Privacy Act statements, which are required on the forms used to
collect information from citizens, are insufficient in that they do not remind citizens that
uses of information can be changed merely on notice published in an obscure publication
called the Federal Register” (38). He adds that the influence of the U.S. Privacy
Protection Study Commission, which took charge of evaluating and reporting on the
efficiency of the Privacy Act in 1975, lasted for only two years when it released
“Personal Privacy in an Information Society” in 1977 (38). More recent legal adaptations
that responded especially to the rise of businesses in cyberspace mostly pertained to very
specific groups of individuals operating online (42). These include, among others, the
oversight of privacy practices for children, individuals and organizations in the health
care sector, and firms in the financial services industry (40-41).
In addition to the legal measures regarding privacy in the United States, the
assignment of institutions that oversee privacy protection reveals a more economically
minded approach to privacy: as only few states such as California have established
freestanding institutions specifically overseeing privacy concerns of citizens, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) serves as the main regulator of consumer privacy (47). Axel
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Spies argues that, while the FTC deals with cases of privacy concerns in cyberspace, it is
mainly concerned with the broader concept of consumer protection (Spies, 2012, 10).
This fact exemplifies the key difference between German and U.S. perceptions of
privacy: in Germany, privacy implies the legal obligation of data protection; in the United
States, privacy refers to a right to privacy, which falls under the broader range of rights
citizens are granted as consumers (8).
The analysis of the legal developments regarding surveillance and privacy
confirm the way in which pre-existing ways of law enforcement and exercise of power
translate onto the governance of cyberspace. Even though U.S. Congress implemented
the Privacy Act and subsequent specialized laws on areas in cyber security, it did not
adequately adapt its laws to the increasing need of privacy in cyberspace to limit the
scope of exercising sovereignty. Instead, the combination of FISA and Patriot Act
reinforce the priority on intelligence. The United States not only maintained its preexisting security measures but also extended them to fully utilize the wealth of
information cyberspace generates.

5. Conclusion
Cyberspace has revealed itself as a new territory in which states seek to follow
their security objectives and, in broader terms, to enforce their sovereignty. Even though
distinct features of cyberspace—the present lack of legitimization of sovereignty, the
ambiguity of territory, and the accessibility of private information—require a drastic
redefinition of how sovereignty manifests itself, states still resort to traditional measures
of exercising power. In the case of German-American relations, the United States seeks
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to project its longstanding hegemony and its past influence on German sovereignty onto
its security measures in the cyber realm. Germany’s reemergence in international
security, however, has decreased the functionality of U.S. influence in German security,
causing the state to desire a more active role in enforcing its security values. Due to the
evolution of German sovereignty, however, this more active role can exist merely within
the context of EU integration and security policy. This polarization between U.S. and
European security interests has traditionally presented a short-term issue in transatlantic
relations; the manifestation of these differences in cyberspace, however, creates a longterm governance issue.
While the United States could rely on short-term coalition building with regards
to conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, the significance of cyberspace in
redefining state sovereignty creates a more fundamental issue that requires a
collaborative evaluation of security threats and an equal playing ground to react to these
threats. International cooperation would help eliminate the speculative nature of cyber
security and eventually the exaggeration of security measures. Additionally, it would
build the foundation for international norms in protecting privacy and combating cyber
crime and future threats of cyber terrorism. Increased transparency among states,
particularly in the transatlantic partnership, would benefit not only the protection of civil
liberties but also the effectiveness of intelligence services in cyberspace. As Gravelle’s
study has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of present cyber surveillance programs due to
a lack of information production, more transparency and information exchange would
allow intelligence services across the Atlantic to target and evaluate information in a
more focused, qualitative manner. Since German officials have acknowledged the need
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for a certain degree of surveillance in cyberspace, the realization of this cooperative
approach depends on the United States’ acknowledgment of the new power dynamic
within the transatlantic community and a more proactive oversight of its intelligence
service in cyberspace.
This dependence indicates that, at this point, German foreign policy in the cyber
age remains linked to U.S. foreign policy interests. The link represents a historical
remainder of Germany’s unique reemergence as a sovereign and autonomous actor in
international security. Therefore, the development of cyberspace provides an occasion to
redefine not only state sovereignty but also the underlying values and interests shaping
the future of German-American relations.
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